RRosternomics
← Trade Database
Share on 𝕏
November 2, 2024

COLMIL

unsettledToo soon to call — players still accruing.
COLCOL Bill Schmidt net +$0.0M net +0.0
received +$1.6M+$1.6M ± $27M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.9 ± 3 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
receives — most valuable first
Owen Miller1B/2B·29y·R/R
+$1.8M+$1.8M± $27M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.9± 3 exp WARrealized 0.0
Prior
league baseline (track record outweighs draft pedigree) → 0.21/yr
Evidence
recent form 0.4/yr over 1.0 season
Talent
0.30/yr blended
Horizon
4.0 control yrs × 0.72 age decline
MILMIL Matt Arnold net +$0.0M net +0.0
received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $0M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.0 ± 0 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
receives — most valuable first
cash / PTBNL
+$0.0M+$0.0M± $0M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.0± 0 exp WARrealized 0.0
Cash or player to be named — no projection

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (Baseball America rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± band is the uncertainty — wide for unproven prospects, tight for established veterans. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.

Historically these expected values are unbiased and land within ±2 WAR of reality 75% of the time — yet the side the model favors actually comes out ahead only 53% of the time. The grade is a calibrated bet, not a prediction. Why trades are an efficient market →