SEA⇄NYM

SEASEA Hal Keller net +$0.0M net +0.1

received +$1.6M+$1.6M ± $24M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 1.1 ± 3 expected · 0.1 realized WAR

Playoff odds: this deal moved SEA's 1985 odds 7% → 7% (+0.2 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗

receives — most valuable first

Frank WillsP·26y·R/R

+$1.3M+$1.3M± $24M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 1.1± 3 exp WARrealized 0.1

Prior

no pedigree — league baseline → 0.21/yr

Evidence

no MLB track record — leans on pedigree

Talent

0.21/yr blended

Horizon

5.5 control yrs × 0.94 age decline

why ▾hide ▴

NYMNYM Frank Cashen net +$0.0M net -0.1

received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $15M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.2 ± 2 expected · 0.0 realized WAR

Playoff odds: this deal moved NYM's 1985 odds 70% → 70% (-0.5 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗

receives — most valuable first

Wray Bergendahl

+$0.3M+$0.3M± $15M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.2± 2 exp WARrealized 0.0

Unidentified minor-league throw-in — valued at the ~0.2 WAR base rate (most produce nothing)

why ▾hide ▴

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (composite top-100 rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± figure is a historically calibrated predictive standard deviation, measuring how widely comparable forecasts have missed around their expected value. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.