Rosternomics
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December 8, 2022

TBRCOL

unsettledToo soon to call — players still accruing.
TBRTBR Erik Neander net +$7.2M net +1.9
received +$1.6M+$1.6M ± $54M expected surplus · +$7.2M realized received 1.1 ± 7 expected · 1.9 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved TBR's 2023 odds 92% → 94% (+1.9 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
Kevin KellyP·26y·R/R
+$1.6M+$1.6M± $54M exp surplusrealized +$7.2M 1.1± 7 exp WARrealized 1.9
Prior
#580 overall draft pick — at the league baseline → 0.21/yr
Evidence
no MLB track record — leans on pedigree
Talent
0.21/yr blended
Horizon
5.5 control yrs × 0.94 age decline
COLCOL Bill Schmidt net −$7.2M net -1.9
received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $0M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.0 ± 0 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved COL's 2023 odds 0% → 0% (-0 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
cash / PTBNL
+$0.0M+$0.0M± $0M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.0± 0 exp WARrealized 0.0
Cash or player to be named — no projection

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (Baseball America rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± band is the uncertainty — wide for unproven prospects, tight for established veterans. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.

Historically these expected values are unbiased and land within ±2 WAR of reality 75% of the time — yet the side the model favors actually comes out ahead only 53% of the time. The grade is a calibrated bet, not a prediction. Why trades are an efficient market →