Rosternomics
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April 30, 2023

MILMIN

unsettledToo soon to call — players still accruing.
MILMIL Matt Arnold net +$12.8M net +4.0
received −$1.6M−$1.6M ± $14M expected surplus · +$12.8M realized received 0.2 ± 2 expected · 4.0 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved MIL's 2023 odds 14% → 17% (+2.5 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
Trevor MegillP·30y·L/R
−$1.6M−$1.6M± $14M exp surplusrealized +$12.8M 0.2± 2 exp WARrealized 4.0
Prior
league baseline (track record outweighs draft pedigree) → 0.21/yr
Evidence
recent form 0.1/yr over 1.6 season
Talent
0.18/yr blended
Horizon
4.4 control yrs × 0.28 age decline
MINMIN Derek Falvey net −$12.8M net -4.0
received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $0M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.0 ± 0 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved MIN's 2023 odds 67% → 63% (-4.4 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
cash / PTBNL
+$0.0M+$0.0M± $0M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.0± 0 exp WARrealized 0.0
Cash or player to be named — no projection

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (Baseball America rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± band is the uncertainty — wide for unproven prospects, tight for established veterans. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.

Historically these expected values are unbiased and land within ±2 WAR of reality 75% of the time — yet the side the model favors actually comes out ahead only 53% of the time. The grade is a calibrated bet, not a prediction. Why trades are an efficient market →