Rosternomics
← Trade Database
Share on 𝕏
January 4, 2023

MILPIT

unsettledToo soon to call — players still accruing.
MILMIL Matt Arnold net −$1.6M net +0.1
received −$2.4M−$2.4M ± $31M expected surplus · −$1.6M realized received 0.1 ± 4 expected · 0.1 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved MIL's 2023 odds 16% → 17% (+1 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
Bryse WilsonP·26y·R/R
−$2.4M−$2.4M± $31M exp surplusrealized −$1.6M 0.1± 4 exp WARrealized 0.1
Prior
league baseline (track record outweighs draft pedigree) → 0.21/yr
Evidence
recent form -0.1/yr over 2.0 seasons
Talent
0.02/yr blended
Horizon
4.0 control yrs
PITPIT Ben Cherington net +$1.6M net -0.1
received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $0M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.0 ± 0 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
Playoff odds: this deal moved PIT's 2023 odds 2% → 2% (-0.2 pts) — how trade timing is graded ↗
receives — most valuable first
cash / PTBNL
+$0.0M+$0.0M± $0M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.0± 0 exp WARrealized 0.0
Cash or player to be named — no projection

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (Baseball America rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± band is the uncertainty — wide for unproven prospects, tight for established veterans. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.

Historically these expected values are unbiased and land within ±2 WAR of reality 75% of the time — yet the side the model favors actually comes out ahead only 53% of the time. The grade is a calibrated bet, not a prediction. Why trades are an efficient market →