Rosternomics
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July 2, 2004

BOSCHC

CHC won this trade +$0.8M surplus BOS won this trade +0.0 WAR
BOSBOS Theo Epstein net −$0.8M net +0.0
received +$1.6M+$0.8M ± $15M expected surplus · −$0.8M realized received 0.5 ± 2 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
receives — most valuable first
Jimmy AndersonP·28y·L/L
+$1.6M+$0.8M± $15M exp surplusrealized −$0.8M 0.5± 2 exp WARrealized 0.0
Prior
league baseline (track record outweighs draft pedigree) → 0.21/yr
Evidence
recent form 0.4/yr over 2.0 seasons
Talent
0.33/yr blended
Horizon
1.5 control yr
CHCCHC Jim Hendry net +$0.8M net +0.0
received +$0.0M+$0.0M ± $12M expected surplus · +$0.0M realized received 0.2 ± 2 expected · 0.0 realized WAR
receives — most valuable first
Andy Shipman
+$0.0M+$0.0M± $12M exp surplusrealized +$0.0M 0.2± 2 exp WARrealized 0.0
Unidentified minor-league throw-in — valued at the ~0.2 WAR base rate (most produce nothing)

Each player is valued on what he was expected to produce at the time of the trade, versus what he actually produced for his new team.

Expected WAR blends a player's pedigree (Baseball America rank / draft slot, or a baseline) with his recent track record, projected over the years of team control acquired. The ± band is the uncertainty — wide for unproven prospects, tight for established veterans. Surplus values that production at the FA market price of a win (~$8M/WAR) minus salary — so cost-controlled players carry large surplus and expensive ones little, even at the same WAR. Who won is descriptive, not a skill claim: ~99% of a trade's outcome is unforeseeable at the time.

Historically these expected values are unbiased and land within ±2 WAR of reality 75% of the time — yet the side the model favors actually comes out ahead only 53% of the time. The grade is a calibrated bet, not a prediction. Why trades are an efficient market →